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1. Introduction 
 
 
Crude oil and natural gas have been essential energy sources and plays an important role in the 
world economy. As changes in energy prices may significantly impact economic growth, the 
movement of energy prices is of great concern to economists and policy makers. 
For the last four decades, oil prices have been controlled by Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and major oil-producing countries and industries. In retrospect, 
between World War II and the 1970s, oil prices were controlled under an international oligopolistic 
oil market by major western oil companies, the so-called Seven Sisters. Oil producers in Arab 
countries suffered from this international cartel of production by these major western oil companies. 
Against these conditions, OPEC was founded in 1960 by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and 
Venezuela with the principal objective of taking back greater control of their own oil production and 
a gain a right to set pricing. Currently, the organization has twelve members: Algeria, Angola, 
Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and 
Venezuela. Subsequently, OPEC took responsibility for virtually 40% of the world’s crude oil 
production and controlled oil prices through its strategy of pricing over volume. Although OPEC had 
little impact on oil for the first decade, an increase in demand worldwide and the decline of 
production by major oil companies of the United States caused OPEC to become a significant 
presence in the international oil market. 
Figure 1 represents the interrelation between the movement of oil price and oil production by 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is seen as the swing producer in OPEC. Apparently, Saudi Arabia’s crude 
oil production affected the determination of the West Texas Intermediate’s (WTI) crude oil prices 
until mid-2014. In contrast, since then, the situation has changed. The relation between oil prices and 
production by Saudi Arabia has been disappearing, and it has become difficult for OPEC to control 
the oil market. 
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Figure 1. Relation between the production changes by Saudi Arabia and WIT oil price 
 
One of reasons for this is the development of alternative energy sources such as natural gas and 
nuclear power and an increase in oil production by non-OPEC. According to Figure 2, natural gas 
production has been increasing worldwide. In particular, this is due to the rising production of 
natural gas by the United States. The increase of the natural gas supply seems to be loosening the 
tension between supply and demand, which has resulted in suppressing the rise of crude oil price in 
the energy market. Crude oil had been the dominant fuel worldwide for a long period of time. 
However, now, natural gas is a competitive form of energy against crude oil. In the near future, 
improving the supply of natural gas and using natural gas as an alternative energy source could 
significantly transform the energy market. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. World Crude Oil Production and Natural Gas Production 
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Based on these considerations, our model is required to describe the demand and supply in 
substitution of two markets: crude oil and natural gas. In addition, the prices of oil and natural gas 
are determined on the basis of the economic law of imperfect competition. Many researchers have 
explored the relation between oil and natural gas prices: Pindyck (2004), Villar and Joutz (2006), 
Kirichene (2005, 2007), Brown and Yucel (2008), and Hartley et al. (2008). Specifically, Kirichene 
(2005, 2007) developed the econometric model that describes the correlation between oil and natural 
gas prices in terms of demand and supply based on the rational expectation framework. The author 
states that changes in oil prices cause changes in natural gas prices, while natural gas prices do not 
affect oil prices. It is insufficient that these models describe the market mechanism of pricing based 
only on supply and demand. Furthermore, some studies developed econometric models that 
determine oil or natural gas prices based on the supply and demand at the macro level. Dees et al. 
(2007) and Krichene (2005, 2007) demonstrated the demand–supply approach. Dees (2007) focused 
only on the oil market, while Krichene (2007) dealt with the correlation between crude oil and 
natural gas markets. Notably, Dees (2007) distinguished non-OPEC and OPEC behaviors. 
Kirichene’s model (2007) is based on the framework of rational expectation. However, their models 
do not directly incorporate optimizing of the producers’ behavior. In contrast, Kosaka (2015) 
proposed the framework that oil and natural gas prices are determined under oligopolistic 
competition. In addition, Kosaka (2015) assumed that the profit maximization behaviors of 
oil-producing countries are distinguished depending on the strategies of each producing country. 
This study builds an empirical model of crude oil and natural gas markets following a 
theoretical framework by Kosaka (2015). In our model, the substitute relation between crude oil and 
natural gas prices is incorporated. Under the assumption of imperfect competition, we assume two 
competing strategies in profit maximization: 1) maximize a country’s own profits and 2) maintain 
stable prices. We estimate the supply functions by these two strategies and target a sample of 22 
oil-producing countries of which 12 are OPEC and 10 are non-OPEC. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical framework 
of crude oil and natural gas markets. In Section 3, we explain the data. In Section 4, we explain the 
empirical analysis and the result of the final test. Finally, the conclusion and remarks are provided in 
Section 5. 
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2. Model 
 
In this section, we illustrate the theoretical framework of crude oil and natural gas markets where the 
prices of crude oil and natural gas are determined from the equilibrium between their demand and 
supply via the substitution between crude oil and natural gas. We suppose that the producing 
countries of crude oil or natural gas have market power to some extent. Therefore, we assume that 
this model is based on an imperfectly competitive market. We basically follow the Kosaka model 
(2015) as shown below.  
 
2.1. Crude Oil Market 
 
2.1.1. Equilibrium in Crude Oil Market  
First, consider the crude oil demand. The aggregate crude oil demand function 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐷  is defined by 
𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐷 = 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3�𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1
 (1)  
where 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 and 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 represent the level of crude oil price at times t and t-1, respectively; 𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  
shows the k-th country’s demand for crude oil; and 𝛼0 , 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , 𝛼3  are parameters, where 
𝛼0 ≥ 0 ,  𝛼1 > 0, and  𝛼3 > 0. The parameter 𝛼3 simply means that the aggregate crude oil depends 
positively on the level of the aggregated demand for crude oil. Increasing (decreasing) the demand 
for crude oil leads to an increase (decrease) in aggregate crude oil demand. Then, the second term of 
(1) shows that the aggregate oil demand and  its price at time t have an inverse relation. Moreover, 
there is no limitation to the effect of oil price at time t-1. If 𝛼2 > 0, the oil price at time t responds 
negatively to that at time t-1. If 𝛼2 < 0, 𝛼2 > 0 is determined reversely against the oil price at time 
t-1. If 𝛼2 = 0, the oil price at time t is determined independently of the effect of oil price at time t-1. 
Next, we see the supply side in the crude oil market. The aggregate world crude oil supply is 
defined by the summed crude oil production by k’s country as follows: 
𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆 = �𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑀
𝑘=1
 (2)  
where 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆  denotes the aggregate world supply of crude oil at time t and 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  is the summed 
crude oil production by k-th country at time t. Namely, the world crude oil supply is defined as the 
summation of the sample oil-producing countries. The optimal oil production by k’s country is 
determined by k’s profit maximization in section 3.1.2.2 
Then, for crude oil market clearing, we assume that supply and demand balance each other: 
                                                   
2 see Table 1 for the sample countries in this study. 
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𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐷 = 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆 = 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 (3)  
From (1), (2), and (3), we obtain the following equation: 
𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3�𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1
= 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆  (4)  
By rearranging (4), the crude oil price is derived as 
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝛼0𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝛼1 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝛼1�𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 − 1𝛼1 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆  (5)  
This implies that the crude oil price at time t depends on that at time t-1, the summed demand for 
crude oil and the world crude oil production. This price model might be explainable. However, the 
determination of oil price should be augmented in two points to develop a model that reflects a more 
realistic market. First, we must consider the effect of those entering the oil market through a 
financial attribute such as hedge funds. Investment and speculation often affect the volatility of oil 
price. Therefore, we set this effect by adding the error term 𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡: 
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝛼0𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝛼1 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝛼1�𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 − 1𝛼1 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆 + 𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 (6)  
Second, the relation between crude oil and natural gas markets is introduced. The demand for crude 
oil is likely to be linked to the substitution between crude oil and natural gas. To do so, we include 
the variable of natural gas price on the demand function (1) as follows: 
𝑋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝐷 = 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3�𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1
+ 𝛼4𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 (1)’ 
where 𝛼4 ≥ 0. The relation of price between crude oil and natural gas is a substitute. If the natural 
gas price is relatively high (low) against the crude oil price, crude oil demand increases (decrease) 
via the substitution effect. Similar to the expansion from (2) to (6), we rearrange the new demand 
function (1)’ and obtain the following oil price model. 
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 = 𝛼0𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝛼1 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝛼1�𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 + 𝛼4𝛼1 𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 − 1𝛼1�𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝑀𝑘=1 + 𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 (7)  
We employ this model of crude oil price instead of (7). 
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2.1.2. Determination of Optimal Oil Production 
In this section, we show the determination of optimal oil quantity for each oil-producing country 
based on profit maximization. 
In the real market, we suppose that different behaviors by oil-producing countries affect the 
international crude oil market. For example, Saudi Arabia plays the role of a swing producer by 
controlling quantity in order to maintain its own desired level profit and keep oil prices stable. 
Among OPEC, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar tend to go along with each other. 
Conversely, among OPEC, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela tend to act against Saudi Arabia and the western 
countries, giving priority to their own profits. 
We take this into account in our model. Therefore, we set two competing strategies in profit 
maximization: (i) oil-producing countries who concentrate on ensuring the stability and 
sustainability of oil price to gain steady profits, and (ii) oil-producing countries who concentrate on 
individual profit seeking. The first category seeks to not only maximize their profit but also take 
price stability into consideration. Stabilization of price by controlling the oil-producing volume helps 
ensure steady profit in the long run. The second category, on the other hand, tends to prioritize 
individual profit maximization over sustainable market. (ii) corresponds to a general strategy under 
imperfect competition in microeconomics, while (i) is the extension of the basic strategy such as that 
used in (ii). The details of each model are as follows. 
 
i) Oil-producing countries who intend to maintain a stable oil price 
In this case, some oil-producing countries attempt to maximize their own profit as well as maintain 
price stability. The following profit function is defined:  
𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = −12𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1�2 + 1𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘∗ �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 � (8)  
where 𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘  represents the parameter and 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘
∗
 is the targeted level of oil production in k’s country. 
The first term formulated by the quadratic loss term indicates the difference between price at times t 
and t-1. If the difference of price between the two time points increases (decreases), the profit would 
decrease (increase) by the quadratic loss. The second term also shows the difference between the 
targeted production level and production at time t. Solving the above for profit maximization, we 
obtain: 
𝜕𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘
𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = −𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1�𝜕𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  
(9)  + 1
𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑘∗ �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝜕𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 − 𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 � = 0                 
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where 𝜕𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘⁄ = −𝜆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 . Here, we reset 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘∗  for 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  and rearrange (9). In this process, 
we redefine the supply function as ?̃?𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 .  
?̃?𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 ��1 −𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1� (10)  
where an increase in marginal cost 𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  and oil price imply a decline in production. This is 
optimal production. However, the oil market is uncertain due to various effects of investment and 
speculation. Therefore, we set an additional term 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘0 to account for effects other than oil price or 
marginal cost as follows: 
𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 − 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1𝑘 = 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘0 + 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘1�?̃?𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 − 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1𝑘 � (11)  
By rearranging (11), the optimal supply function of k’s country is given by 
𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘0 + �1 − 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘1�𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1𝑘 + 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘1�𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 �𝜆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 �1 −𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1�� (12)  
This model is employed into the whole system as the supply function. 
 
 
ii) Oil-producing countries that intend to simply maximize their own profit 
In this case, some oil-producing countries attempt to maximize their own profit. The following profit 
function is defined: 
𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  (13)  
Partially differentiating by 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 , the functional form is shown as 
𝜕𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘
𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 + 𝜕𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 − 𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = 0 (14)  
where 𝜕𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 𝜕𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘⁄ = −𝜆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 . Rearranging (14), the following equation is derived as follows:  
𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 �𝜆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘  (15)  
Similarly, we set an additional term 𝜌𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘0 to account for effects other than oil price or marginal cost 
as follows: 
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𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 = 𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘0 + �1 − 𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘1�𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡−1𝑘 + 𝜑𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘1𝜆𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 �𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑘 � (16)  
 
 
2.2. Natural Gas Market 
This section represents the natural gas market. The mechanism of the natural gas market is basically 
similar to that of the oil market. Therefore, the explanations of some parts are omitted. 
 
2.2.1. Equilibrium in Natural Gas Market 
Following (1), the aggregate demand for natural gas is defined as  
𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝐷 = 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3�𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1
+ 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 (17)  
where 𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝐷  denotes the aggregate natural gas demand, 𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 represents the natural gas price at 
time t, and 𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘  is the demand for natural gas by k’s country. The parameters 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 
𝛽4 are similar to 𝛼0 ≥ 0 ,  𝛼1 > 0, and  𝛼3 > 0 in the crude oil model. The substitute relation 
between crude oil and natural gas is taken into consideration. 
Regarding the supply side, the aggregate world natural gas production is the summation of gas 
production by k country as follows:  
𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑆 = �𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘𝑀
𝑘=1
 (18)  
Here, it assumes that the aggregate demand for natural gas balances to the aggregate supply. 
𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝐷 = 𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑆 = 𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 (19)  
Similar to the crude oil market, rearranging (17), (18), and (19) and taking into consideration the 
error term, the natural gas price is driven as follows: 
𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝛽1 𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝛽1�𝐷𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 + 𝛽4𝛽1 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡 − 1𝛽1�𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘𝑀𝑘=1 + 𝑢𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 (20)  
As the specification shows, the natural gas price is affected by the substitutive effect of the crude oil 
price. 
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2.2.2. Determination of Optimal Natural Gas Production 
For the natural gas market, we assume the profit function as  
𝜋𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘 = 𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘 − 𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘  (21)  
Solving this profit maximization in a manner similar to the oil model, we obtain the following 
supply function of natural gas for k’s country. 
𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘 = 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑘0 + �1 −𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑘1 �𝑆𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡−1𝑘 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑘1𝜆𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘 �𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑘 � (22)  
 
 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. Sample Period and Data Source 
This study uses annual data from 1990 to 2014.3 The supply and demand data of crude oil and 
natural gas are taken from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. The annual spot prices of 
crude oil and natural gas are from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) website. The data of 
marginal cost of the oil or natural gas industry and the marginal cost of each oil-producing country’s 
mining industry are not available. Therefore, the variables of marginal cost are omitted from the 
model. 
 
Price Data 
Regarding price data, the representative crude oil price in our model is the oil price from the WTI 
benchmark. The global crude oil market has three significant benchmarks: WTI, Brent Blend, and 
Dubai. These play an important role in crude oil pricing worldwide. Above all, the WTI benchmark 
is accepted as the most accurate indicator of international crude oil prices because it is the most 
actively traded in the global oil market due to its excellent liquidity and price transparency. Other 
crude oil prices worldwide tend to be pegged to the WTI. Then, for the natural gas price, we use the 
Henry Hub natural gas spot price. Natural gas is susceptible to conditions in local areas. Regardless, 
Henry Hub is a representative price to use as a benchmark of the world natural gas market. 
 
 
                                                   
3 This study uses annual data due to data availability. If available, it would be more desirable to use 
quarterly data.  
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Selected Countries 
Our sample of 20 oil-producing countries contains 12 OPEC and 8 non-OPEC. The sample of oil 
demanding countries also contains 20 different countries. The sample of natural gas producing 
countries is 18, and the sample of natural gas consuming countries is 20. These sample countries are 
the major producers and consumers who affect the oil and natural gas markets as well as the world 
economy. They are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample Countries in Crude Oil and Natural Gas Markets 
 
Crude Oil  Natural Gas 
 Supply Demand Supply Demand 
1 Algeria* (DZA) Brazil (BRA) Canada (CAN) Argentina (ARG) 
2 Angola* (AGO) Canada (CAN) China (CHN) Brazil (BRA) 
3 Brazil (BRA) China (CHN) Indonesia (IDN) Canada (CAN) 
4 Canada (CAN) Germany (DEU) Iran (IRN) China (CHN) 
5 China (CHN) France (FRA) Mexico (MEX) Germany (DEU) 
6 Ecuador* (ECU) India (IND) Malaysia (MYS) France (FRA) 
7 India (IND) Indonesia (IDN) Netherlands (NLD) India (IND) 
8 Indonesia (IDN) Iran (IRN) Norway (NOR) Indonesia (IDN) 
9 Iran* (IRN) Italy (ITA) Qatar (QAT) Italy (ITA) 
10 Iraq* (IRQ) Japan (JPN) Russia (RUS) Japan (JPN) 
11 Kazakhstan (KAZ) Korea (KOR) Saudi Arabia (SAU) Korea (KOR) 
12 Kuwait* (KWT) Mexico (MEX) Turkmenistan (TKM) Malaysia (MYS) 
13 Libya* (LBY) Russia (RUS) United Arab Emirates (ARE) Mexico (MEX) 
14 Mexico (MEX) Saudi Arabia (SAU) United States (USA) Netherlands (NLD) 
15 Nigeria* (NGA) Singapore (SGP) Uzbekistan (UZB) Russia (RUS) 
16 Norway (NOR) Spain (ESP)  Spain (ESP) 
17 Qatar* (QAT) United Kingdom (GBR)  Thailand (THA) 
18 Russia (RUS) United Sates (USA)  United Arab Emirates (ARE) 
19 Saudi Arabia* (SAU) -  United Kingdom (GBR) 
20 United Arab Emirates* (ARE) -  United States (USA) 
21 United States (USA) -   
22 Venezuela* (VEN) -   
Note: * denotes a member of OPEC. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Estimation Results of Each Model 
This study builds a model to illustrate the world markets for crude oil and natural gas. To this end, 
we estimate each model that is shown in the previous section. We run the ordinal least-squares to 
estimate prices of crude oil and natural gas, and the supply functions in the sample period from 1990 
to 2014. In this section, we show the estimated results.  
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Price 
Tables 2 and 3 represent the estimated results of crude oil and natural gas prices. Statistics shows 
that prices are well estimated. Both tables clearly show that the natural gas price affects the crude oil 
price, and vice versa. From the estimated results, we learn that the relation between crude oil and 
natural gas prices substitute each other. We conclude that the calculations are acceptable. 
 
 
Table 2. Estimation of Crude Oil Spot Price (WTI) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
WTI Crude Oil Spot Price (t-1) 1.130***  0.147  
Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price 3.133**  1.090  
ln (Aggregated Crude Oil Demand) 40.470  88.275  
ln (Aggregated Crude Oil Supply) -72.415  102.487  
Dummy 2000 6.845***  1.938  
Dummy 2009 -47.379***  6.417  
Constant 532.724  662.242  
Observation  25 
Adj. R-squared  0.959  
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Estimation of Natural Gas Spot Price (Henry Hub) 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient S.E. 
Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (t-1) 0.627***  0.130  
WTI Crude Oil Spot Price 0.047  0.032  
Aggregated Natural Gas Demand 0.014**  0.005  
Aggregated Natural Gas Supply -0.015*  0.006  
Dummy 2005 2.907***  0.342  
Dummy 2009 -3.579***  0.693  
Constant 3.070  3.758  
Observation  25 
Adj. R-squared  0.830  
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Supply Functions of Crude Oil 
In the previous section, we assume two competing strategies in profit maximization. That is, we 
propose two types of supply functions of (12) and (16). Therefore, after we estimate the two types of 
supply functions for each oil-producing country, we select the more favorable model between the 
two. We explain the detailed process of model selection before showing the estimated results. 
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First, we estimate two types supply functions, which are (12) and (16), for all oil-producing 
sample countries by applying ordinal least-squares regression. Second, we perform the sign test and 
the statistic robust check. If the two types of supply functions of each country have the correct sign 
and the results of the statistic check are sufficient, we select more a desirable model based on the 
Akaike information criteria. Otherwise, both models are rejected. If either model shows the correct 
sign and is well estimated, we accept it. By performing these tests, oil-producing countries are 
divided into three categories (Table 4): i) the supply function for price stability based on (12), ii) the 
supply function for simple profit maximization base on (16), and iii) reject. According to Table 4, 
Saudi Arabia belongs to “Price Stable.” Therefore, this result is consistent with a hypothesis that 
Saudi Arabia is a swing producer. Tables 5 and 6 report the estimated results of the acceptable 
models. Equation (12) is a highly nonlinear regression model. Repeating much iteration, we 
calculate parameter 𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 , which shows the magnitude of k-th country’s intention for price stability. 
We conclude that they are basically acceptable. 
 
 
Table 4. Distinction of Profit Maximization Strategy 
 
Sample Country 
Price 
Stability 
Profit 
Non-OPEC Brazil (BRA) ✓  
 Canada (CAN) ✓  
 China (CHN)  ✓ 
 India (IND)  ✓ 
 Indonesia (IDN) Reject 
 Kazakhstan (KAZ) ✓  
 Mexico (MEX) ✓  
 Norway (NOR) Reject 
 Russia (RUS)  ✓ 
 United States (USA)  ✓ 
OPEC Angola (AGO) ✓  
 Algeria (DZA) ✓  
 Ecuador (ECU) Reject 
 Iran (IRN) Reject 
 Iraq (IRQ)  ✓ 
 Kuwait (KWT)  ✓ 
 Libya (LBY) Reject 
 
Nigeria (NGA) Reject 
 
Qatar (QAT)  ✓ 
 
Saudi Arabia (SAU) ✓  
 
United Arab Emirates (ARE)  ✓ 
 
Venezuela (VEZ) ✓  
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Table 5. Estimation Results of Crude Oil Supply Function in Equation (12): Price Stability 
 
BRA CAN DZA KAZ SAU VEN RUS USA 
Crude Oil 
Supply (t-1) 
1.044*** 
(0.01) 
1.034*** 
(0.006) 
1.002*** 
(0.009) 
1.033*** 
(0.01) 
1.022*** 
(0.015) 
1.004*** 
(0.012) 
0.933*** 
(0.031) 
0.962*** 
(0.01) 
WTI Spot Price 
2.894 
(1.981) 
495.139 
(502.348) 
2.218 
(1.421) 
7.002** 
(2.947) 
90.332 
(160.19) 
163.643 
(151.676) 
4239.197** 
(1499.187) 
3359.497*
* 
(1113.002) 
Regional 
Dummy 1    
48031.51** 
(19083.59)   
-212694.1*** 
(51281.42)  
Parameter 𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘  4.330 1.878 4.332 4.332 0.276 0.786 0.442 0.627 
Observation 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adj. R-Squared 0.986  0.979  0.904  0.989  0.615  0.694  0.924  0.877  
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Estimation Results of Crude Oil Supply Function in Equation (16): Profit Maximization 
 
ARE CHN IND IRQ KWT QAT RUS USA 
Crude Oil 
Supply (t-1) 
0.992*** 
(0.027) 
1.014*** 
(0.006) 
0.981*** 
(0.019) 
0.709*** 
(0.142) 
0.971*** 
(0.067) 
0.919*** 
(0.048) 
0.933*** 
(0.031) 
0.962*** 
(0.01) 
WTI Spot 
Price 
629.232 
(481.93) 
82.002 
(172.64) 
130.934 
(92.258) 
3907.753* 
(1542.62) 
867.088 
(1007.61) 
1019.133*** 
(313.815) 
4239.197** 
(1499.187) 
3359.497** 
(1113.002) 
Regional 
Dummy 1   
35267.74** 
(12545.53)    
-212694.1*** 
(51281.42)  
Observation 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Adj. 
R-Squared 
0.807 0.982 0.848 0.971 0.795 0.982 0.924 0.877 
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Supply functions of Natural Gas 
Natural-gas-producing countries are also estimated by applying ordinal least-squares. China, Iran, 
Mexico, Malaysia, and Norway are basically acceptable, while Canada, Indonesia, Indonesia, United 
Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan are rejected based on the sign test and statistic robust check. Table 7 
reports the estimated results of the natural gas supply function in (22). Therefore, supply functions of 
China, Iran, Mexico, Malaysia, and Norway are endogenized in the whole system. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results of Natural Gas Supply Function 
 
CHN  IRN MEX MYS NOR 
Natural Gas Supply (t-1) 
1.059*** 
(0.011) 
1.017*** 
(0.021) 
0.957*** 
(0.034) 
0.968*** 
(0.03) 
0.974*** 
(0.051) 
Henry Hub Spot Price 
0.579*** 
(0.126) 
0.986** 
(0.407) 
0.681* 
(0.374) 
0.669* 
(0.29) 
1.037* 
(0.579) 
Regional Dummy 1 
  
-5.913*** 
(1.035)   
Regional Dummy 2 
  
4.695*** 
(0.386)   
Observation 25.000  25  25  25  25  
Adj. R-Squared 0.998  0.987  0.975  0.971  0.979  
(Continued) 
 
 
QAT 
 
RUS 
 
SAU 
 
TKM 
 
USA 
Natural Gas Supply (t-1) 
1.070*** 
(0.047) 
0.988*** 
(0.013) 
1.035*** 
(0.024) 
0.797*** 
(0.085) 
1.018*** 
(0.012) 
Henry Hub Spot Price 
0.796** 
(0.282) 
1.857 
(1.124) 
0.252 
(0.229) 
2.063** 
(0.707) 
0.013 
(1.479) 
Regional Dummy 1 
 
-67.382*** 
(3.531)    
Regional Dummy 2 
 
52.64*** 
(2.597)    
Observation 25 25 25 25 25 
Adj. R-Squared 0.981  0.987  0.988  0.661  0.987  
Note: Adj. R-Squared is adjusted R-squared. “S.E.” indicates robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
4.2. Final Test Results 
 
In total, our crude oil and natural gas model is composed of 28 simultaneous equations: 26   
estimated equations (crude oil and natural gas prices and their supply functions), and two 
definitional identities (the aggregated supply of crude oil and natural gas).The final test of this 
system is based on data from 1990 to 2014 (annual). Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the results of the final 
test for the crude oil spot price (WIT), natural gas spot price (Henry Hub), aggregate crude oil supply, 
aggregate natural gas supply, each country’s crude oil supply, and each country’s natural gas supply. 
Although some endogenous variables might be not sufficiently satisfactory, the simulated value can 
trace the actual values. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Henry Hub Natural Gas Price
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
WTI Crude Oil Price
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
2,400
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Aggregate Natural Gas Supply
18,000,000
20,000,000
22,000,000
24,000,000
26,000,000
28,000,000
30,000,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Aggregate Crude Oil Supply
 
 
 
Figure 3. Final Test Results of Prices and Aggregated Supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Brazil, Crude Oil
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Canada, Crude Oil
1,000,000
1,100,000
1,200,000
1,300,000
1,400,000
1,500,000
1,600,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
China, Crude Oil
200,000
240,000
280,000
320,000
360,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
India, Crude Oil
1,000,000
1,100,000
1,200,000
1,300,000
1,400,000
1,500,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Mexico, Crude Oil
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
4,500,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Russia, Crude Oil
2,400,000
2,800,000
3,200,000
3,600,000
4,000,000
4,400,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
United States, Crude Oil
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
650,000
700,000
750,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Algeria, Crude Oil
0
400,000
800,000
1,200,000
1,600,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Iraq, Crude Oil
0
400,000
800,000
1,200,000
1,600,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Kuwait, Crude Oil
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Qatar, Crude Oil
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
4,500,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Saudi Arabia, Crude Oil
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
UAE, Crude Oil
700,000
800,000
900,000
1,000,000
1,100,000
1,200,000
1,300,000
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
Actual Baseline
Venezuela, Crude Oil
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Figure 5. Final Test Results of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Supply 
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Furthermore, we show the evaluation of model fitness. Several criteria are used to evaluate the 
accuracy of the estimated value by the final test. In particular, the root mean square error (RMSE), 
root mean square percentage error (RMSPE), Von Neumann Ratio (V.N.), and mean absolute error 
(MAE) are often utilized. These are respectively defined as follows: 
 
 RMSE = �1
𝑇
∑ �𝑋�𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡�
2𝑇
𝑡=1   (23)  
 RMSPE = �1
𝑇
∑ �
𝑋�𝑡−𝑋𝑡
𝑋𝑡
�
2
𝑇
𝑡=1 × 100  (24)  
 V. N. = 1𝑇−1�∑ {(𝑋�𝑡−𝑋𝑡)−(𝑋�𝑡−1−𝑋𝑡−1)}2𝑇𝑡=1 �1
𝑇
∑ �𝑋�𝑡−
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑋�𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 �
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
  (25)  
 MAE = 1
𝑇
∑ �𝑋𝑡 − 𝑋�𝑡�
𝑇
𝑡=1   (26)  
where 𝑋𝑡  is the actual observation time series, 𝑋�  denotes the estimated time series, and T 
represents the number of time series data. We test the performance of the simulated value by 
applying for these criteria samples from 1990 to 2014. The results are shown in Table 8. We infer 
that this system is acceptable, which describes crude oil and natural gas markets. 
 
 
Table 8. Evaluation of Model Performance by Four Criteria  
 
 RMSE RMSPE V.N. MAE 
_P_GAS_HENRY_HUB  0.79  2.15  0.03  0.57  
_P_OIL_WTI  5.51  1.54  1.15  3.93  
GAS_S_CHN  1.52  0.41  0.01  1.22  
GAS_S_IRN  3.24  0.45  0.09  2.42  
GAS_S_MEX  1.39  0.32  0.01  0.97  
GAS_S_MYS  2.54  0.61  0.07  1.95  
GAS_S_NOR  4.01  0.63  0.37  2.91  
GAS_S_QAT  6.82  0.96  0.28  4.36  
GAS_S_RUS  11.01  0.22  0.38  8.43  
GAS_S_SAU  2.11  0.32  0.05  1.58  
GAS_S_TKM  7.46  3.07  4.85  5.05  
GAS_S_USA  13.91  0.26  0.25  10.02  
OIL_S_ARE  50047.16  0.48  25396568.93  37767.81  
OIL_S_BRA  28687.84  0.51  6012623.94  20987.68  
OIL_S_CAN  33367.81  0.28  1929629.84  24989.47  
OIL_S_CHN  21996.18  0.16  946067.70  13237.86  
OIL_S_DZA  28257.54  0.45  1199138.71  20098.07  
OIL_S_IND  7632.10  0.26  346347.40  5689.24  
OIL_S_IRQ  108440.24  1.57  1057909231.52  64892.55  
OIL_S_KWT  50018.21  0.55  30972572.60  37390.31  
OIL_S_MEX  44048.26  0.37  2953370.04  33196.10  
OIL_S_QAT  26587.57  0.69  6448863.32  20365.86  
OIL_S_RUS  140161.67  0.47  4645992.16  97710.06  
20 
 
OIL_S_SAU  179898.86  0.50  416080769.19  136437.25  
OIL_S_USA  125579.59  0.41  10244815.12  85793.55  
OIL_S_VEN  56953.68  0.50  27121824.23  40204.80  
XS_GAS  20.56  0.11  0.21  12.95  
XS_OIL  450107.69  0.19  232527497.58  318595.30  
 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
Given the complexity of the international crude oil and natural gas markets, this study proposed an 
econometric model that shows the prices of crude oil and natural gas are endogenized based on the 
demand and supply approach. The mechanism of determining prices was taken into account in the 
substitution between crude oil and natural gas. In particular, profit maximization is assumed to be 
based on the following two strategies of oil-producing countries: oil-producing countries that intend 
to preserve market stability and those that intend simply to maximize their own profit. We simulated 
the final test and evaluated the accuracy of the whole model’s performance by the criteria method of 
RMSE, RMSPE, V.N., and MAE. The results for several variables are not necessarily satisfactory. If 
quarterly data were available, the performance might be improved. However, the final test shows 
that, overall, our model could be traceable to the actual value.  
However, in future, we should extend this model to improve its applicability to policy analysis. 
First, the demand for crude oil and natural gas should be endogenized. Since the demand for energy 
depends on the level of an economy, the macroeconomic economy model can be linked to our crude 
oil and natural gas model. Furthermore, the volume of CO2 emissions at the macro level can be 
calculated by linking the crude oil and natural gas model to a macroeconomic model. Thus, 
improving this model to a more comprehensive system would support evaluations of monetary or 
energy policy.
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